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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey will review major cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Florida and the Florida District Courts of Appeal from July 2003 until July
2005. It does not cover every single appellate opinion from that time period,
but does address those that dealt with substantive tort issues for the first time
or clarified existing doctrines and issues. It does not deal with cases that
dealt primarily with evidentiary rule violations or restated, well-established
principles.
Part II addresses a variety of situations clarifying when or whether a
duty exists on behalf of a number of actors. Part III covers cases that re-
solved causation disputes. The remaining parts deal with recurring situations
or special rules that have resulted in multiple opinions being issued during
this time period. For example, a number of cases during the past two years
have tried to clarify the extent of coverage of Florida's nursing home resi-
dent rights statutes. In addition, Florida courts continue to develop and ex-
plain the contours of the evolving area of emotional distress claims. Finally,
the last part includes a number of cases involving a broad range of issues.
The number of cases decided indicates that Florida courts are still quite busy
in refining and clarifying the contours of various tort doctrines.
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, J.D.,
Indiana University, 1978; B.A., Indiana University, 1975.
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II. DUTY
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the question of duty in relation
to streetlight maintenance in Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson.'
This case involved "fourteen-year-old Dante Johnson ... [who] was struck
and killed by a truck" in the early morning "where a streetlight was inopera-
tive."2 His grandmother sued the truck driver, truck owner, and streetlight
maintenance company, Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Clay Electric). In
the trial court, Clay Electric "moved for summary judgment, which was
granted."
4
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the issue of whether Clay
Electric assumed a legal duty to the plaintiffs to act with reasonable care in
maintaining the streetlights.' The court ruled that it created an increased risk
by failing to maintain the light and rejected the argument that an inoperative
light was no worse than the risk would have been absent a streetlight.6 The
court also stated that the deceased's grandmother relied upon Clay Electric to
maintain the lights in foregoing other precautions for the deceased It also
rejected the defendant's immunity argument.8 Justice Cantero argued in dis-
sent that the holding "places Florida in the decided minority of states that
have considered this issue." 9 He also argued that the decision to hold the
utility company liable involved a legislative policy decision.1°
In Smith v. Florida Power & Light Co.," the Second District Court of
Appeal also addressed the duty of a public utility. 12 Smith appealed the entry
of a summary judgment in favor of Florida Power & Light (FPL).'3 Smith
was injured while working at a construction site. 14 "[P]ower passed from an
uninsulated overhead power transmission line through the boom of a crane
while Smith was working below ground and touching the cable of the
crane.""5 Smith's employer had determined that its employees could safely
1. 873 So. 2d 1182, 1184 (Fla. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1185.
6. Clay Elec. Coop., Inc., 873 So. 2d at 1187.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1188.
9. Id. at 1195 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 1202-05.
11. 857 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
12. Id. at 227.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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work around the electrical lines.' 6 The court held that the power company's
general knowledge that a construction project would be conducted in prox-
imity to its power lines was insufficient to establish a foreseeable zone of
risk creating a duty. 7
In Bowling v. Gilman,8 the Second District Court of Appeal considered
another duty issue in a construction site accident.' 9 Bowling was a carpenter
working for a subcontractor engaged in the construction of an adult congre-
gate living facility.2 ° The subcontractor engaged defendant Gilman and his
solely owned corporation for the use of cranes.2' It was alleged that a fore-
man on the site was negligent in directing a crane.2 The court noted that
Florida law deems a crane to be inherently dangerous and that the owner and
operator of such has a non-delegable duty to use due care.23 The court held
that a crane operator could assign its performance to another, but not liability
for negligent breach of that duty, and thus remanded the case for a new trial
so that the jury could be instructed on Gilman's potential vicarious liability.24
The Third District Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of duty in Fisher
v. Miami-Dade County.25 The case involved a claim by the personal repre-
sentative of Fisher, who died in an automobile accident as a passenger in a
car driven by a friend who was speeding and being pursued by a Miami-
Dade police vehicle.26 The trial court granted summary judgment to the de-
fendant based upon the conclusion that a police officer owes no duty to a
passenger in a fleeing vehicle unless the officer knows or should know of the
passenger's presence.
The court noted that the Supreme Court of Florida has held that "police
owe a duty to innocent bystanders or third parties injured as a result of high
speed chases. 28 It also noted that courts in other states have split on the is-
sue of whether the police owe a duty of care to passengers in a fleeing vehi-
cle.29 The court decided that the chilling effect of imposing upon law en-
16. Smith, 857 So. 2d at 227.
17. Id. at 235.
18. 870 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
19. Id. at 43.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Bowling, 870 So. 2d at 43.
24. Id. at 43-44.
25. 883 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
26. Id. at 335-36.
27. Id. at 337.
28. Id. at 336 (citing City of Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So. 2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. 1992)).
29. Id. at 337.
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forcement the duty to determine if there was a passenger in the vehicle and
also to determine if the passenger was involved in a crime, was too burden-
some to impose, and, therefore, affirmed the decision that no duty was owed
in this case. 0
In Royal & Sunalliance v. Lauderdale Marine Center,31 the Fourth Dis-
trict considered a spoliation of evidence case.32 Royal & Sunalliance (Royal)
insured vessels which were burned while being repaired in a space leased by
Cay Marine, located at the Lauderdale Marine Center (LMC).33 Royal filed a
subrogation action to recover amounts paid to the owner of one of the vessels
against Cay Marine.3 4 In 2002, Royal added LMC as a defendant. Royal
asserted in its fourth amended complaint that LMC "had a common law duty
to preserve debris" that was collected by fire inspectors from the fire and
placed in barrels. 36 The debris had been discarded in July 1998. 3' According
to the court, because Royal did not allege a contractual or statutory duty to
preserve the evidence, nor did they allege that a discovery request was
served, the complaint against LMC was properly dismissed.38 The court re-
fused to accept Royal's argument that "there was a common law duty to pre-
serve the evidence in anticipation of litigation."39
In K.M. v. Publix Super Markets, Inc. ,40 the Fourth District again con-
sidered the duty issue. 4' K.M., a minor, and her father appealed a granted
motion to dismiss an action which claimed that her mother's employer
should have warned her about another employee's criminal background.42
K.M.'s mother arranged for Robert Woodlard, another Publix employee, to
baby sit for seven-year-old K.M.43 The store manager was aware that Wood-
lard was doing the babysitting and "also knew that Woodlard was on parole
from a previous conviction for attempted sexual battery on a minor under
[twelve]."44 "Woodlard sexually abused K.M. on at least two occasions. 45
30. Fisher, 883 So. 2d at 337.
31. 877 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
32. Id. at 844.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Royal & Sunalliance, 877 So. 2d at 844-45.
37. Id. at 845.
38. Id. at 845-46.
39. Id. at 846.
40. 895 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
41. Id. at 1116.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. K.M., 895 So. 2d at 1116.
[Vol. 30:1:75
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The court refused to find a special relationship that imposed a duty on Publix
to warn in this case.46 The court held that "[a]n employer does not owe a
duty to persons who are injured by its employees while the employees are off
duty, not then acting for the employer's benefit, not on the employer's prem-
ises, and not using the employer's equipment.
47
The Fourth District Court of Appeal resolved an appeal of a dismissal of
a negligence claim in Marinacci v. 219 South Atlantic Blvd.48 The "plaintiff
sued the defendant, a night club, for negligently advising her to park at a
nearby city-owned parking lot, late at night," where she was assaulted.49 The
plaintiff alleged that the club knew or should have known about similar
criminal incidents at that lot.5° The court ruled that the fact that the club did
not own the lot did not absolve it of liability if it was negligent in advising its
patrons to park there. 51
I. CAUSATION
In Deese v. McKinnonville Hunting Club, Inc.,5  the First District Court
of Appeal addressed the classic tort issue of proximate causation.5 3 The De-
ese case involved an accident that occurred during a dog hunt organized by
the defendant hunt club in which dogs were used to drive deer into open ar-
eas to be shot by the hunters. 4 During this hunt, the dogs drove the deer
toward a county highway with a speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour.55
While parked alongside the road, the appellant's twelve-year-old son asked
the appellant if he could help catch the dogs.56 After being given permission,
he exited the appellant's truck and was struck by a vehicle traveling down
the highway. Three days later, he died.58 The appellant alleged that the
hunt club "breached its duty to promulgate, draft, and enforce rules and regu-
lations to ensure that club activities would be conducted in the safest manner
46. Id. at 1120.
47. Id. (footnote omitted).
48. 855 So. 2d 1272, 1272 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1273.
52. 874 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
53. Id. at 1284.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Deese, 874 So. 2d at 1284.
58. Id.
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possible."' 9 The defendant successfully moved for summary judgment, argu-
ing that it was not negligent as a matter of law and that "its actions were not
the proximate legal cause of the accident."' However, the court of appeal
held that it was not appropriate to grant summary judgment on these facts
where reasonable persons could conclude that conducting a hunt near a
highway in which dogs might enter and where club members were directed
to catch when possible could foreseeably lead to some injury as occurred in
this case.61 Furthermore, the court held that to the extent that the appellant's
part in permitting his son to exit the vehicle contributed to the accident, it
was a question of comparative negligence as opposed to a superseding inter-
vening cause relieving the appellee from liability.
62
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed a final judgment on a
proximate cause issue in Murphy v. Sarasota Ostrich Farm/Ranch, Inc.
63
This case involved a claim by the ostrich farm that dogs owned by one of the
defendants and kept on the property of another caused death or injury to
some of its ostriches. 64 At issue on appeal was whether the defendants could
be held liable for lost bird production caused by the dogs' harassment of the
ostriches.6 5  The plaintiffs expert "testified that a male ostrich can be
stressed to the point where he will not breed," but because he failed to state
that the acts of the dogs were "more likely than not... a substantial factor in
bringing about any loss in production," the court found the evidence insuffi-
cient to support that their acts were a legal cause of the injury.66
In Trembath v. Beach Club, Inc.,67 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
also decided a case on appeal on the issue of proximate cause.68 Beach Club,
Inc., sued Trembath for crashing his rental car into its building.69 Amongst
the damages awarded, it claimed expenses for the installation of a sprinkler
system.70 The club had managed to avoid being cited for failure to have such
a system in an earlier routine inspection, but pursuant to the inspection con-
ducted after the crash, which permitted a more thorough inspection, the club
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1286.
61. Id. at 1290.
62. Deese, 874 So. 2d at 1290.
63. 875 So. 2d 767, 769 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
64. Id. at 768.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 768-69.
67. 860 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
68. Id. at513.
69. Id.
70. Id.
[Vol. 30:1:75
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was found to be in violation of relevant safety codes.7' Testimony at trial
indicated "that the club was not in compliance with the code before the acci-
dent," but had simply managed to avoid being discovered as out-of-
compliance until the inspection after the accident.72 The court held that the
defendant could not be held responsible for the cost of installing the sprinkler
system because it was not a cause-in-fact of that requirement, which was a
duty existing separate and apart from the accident.73
IV. PREMISES LIABILITY
In the case of Poe v. IMC Phosphates MP, Inc. , Scotty Poe drove a
vehicle containing his three minor children from a public highway onto a
paved driveway through an abandoned entrance to a mine owned by the de-
fendant, IMC Phosphates, and hit a large metal pipe placed about twenty feet
inside the entrance by the defendant.75 The paved portion at the entrance,
which lacked a sign or other warning, appeared to be a continuation of the
highway and was not illuminated.76 The pipe, which was a rusty brown color
that was neither bright nor reflective, was placed at the point where the
pavement ended.77 In opposition to the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of an expert who opined that
the defendant could have used a different type of fencing and an easily visi-
ble lightweight barricade along with a sign to minimize possible collisions.78
The Second District Court of Appeal addressed the trial court's analysis
which focused on the issue of the status of the Poes as entrants to the defen-
dant's property.79 The court noted that courts from several jurisdictions have
held "that a traveler who enters private land that appears to be a continuation
of the public highway becomes an implied invitee.' '80 For implied invitees,
the landowner has a duty to exercise due care. 8' Noting that legal commenta-
tors have criticized the "transparent legal fiction" of the "implied invitee,"
71. Id.
72. Trembath, 860 So. 2d at 514.
73. Id. at 515.
74. 885 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
75. Id. at 398-99.
76. Id. at 399.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 399-400.
79. Poe, 885 So. 2d at 400. The court noted that the accident occurred before the 1999
amendments to section 768.075 of the Florida Statutes, which immunized property owners
from liability for injuries to trespassers. Id. at 400 n.3.
80. Id. at 401.
81. Id.
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the court instead referenced the modem approach which focuses on the cause
of the traveler leaving the public road.82 Thus, it held that the classification
of the visitor was irrelevant, and, instead, the analysis should depend upon
whether the actor's conduct misled the traveler into reasonably believing that
the land entered is a highway.8 3 The court noted that the Third and Fourth
Districts have also adopted this approach,' which is consistent with section
367 of the Second Restatement of Torts.85 Therefore, in this particular case,
summary judgment was obviously inappropriate because of factual issues
concerning the placement and visibility of the pipe in addition to issues un-
der section 368 of the Second Restatement of Torts concerning artificial con-
ditions near a highway.86
The Second District also dealt with a premises liability case in St. Jo-
seph's Hospital v. Cowart,8 7 in which a patient at the defendant St. Joseph's
Hospital was bitten by a black widow spider in the emergency room. 88 The
court noted the general rule is:
[a] landowner owes two duties to a business invitee: (1) to use reasonable
care in maintaining its premises in a reasonably safe condition; and (2) to
give the invitee warning of concealed perils that are or should be known
to the landowner and that are unknown to the invitee and cannot be dis-
covered through the exercise of due care. 8
9
Florida law does not impose a general duty to protect invitees from harm
caused by wild animals except in special circumstances. 90 The District Court
reversed the jury award because "[tihere was no evidence that the pest con-
trol company was not performing its services satisfactorily," nor that it knew
that a black widow spider was on its premises.9 Further, the plaintiffs ex-
82. Id. at 402.
83. Poe, 885 So. 2d at 402.
84. Id. at 403 (citing Felton v. W. Gables Homes, Inc., 484 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); Hollywood Corporate Circle Assocs. v. Amato, 604 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992)).
85. Section 367 states:
A possessor of land who so maintains a part thereof that he knows or should know that others
will reasonably believe it to be a public highway is subject to liability for physical harm caused
to them, while using such part as a highway, by his failure to exercise reasonable care to main-
tain it in a reasonably safe condition for travel.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 367 (1965).
86. Poe, 885 So. 2d at 404; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 368 (1965).
87. 891 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
88. Id. at 1040.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1041.
91. Id. at 1042-43.
[Vol. 30:1:75
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pert testified that "he did not think [that] the hospital employees should have
suspected [the spider's] presence. 92 Of more interest is a claim by the plain-
tiff for negligent infliction of emotional distress based upon the plaintiff feel-
ing that the hospital employees were not taking his condition seriously and
the emergency room physician joking about the situation with one of his
colleagues.93 Fortunately for the defendant hospital, Florida's reliance upon
the impact rule prevented liability because the court correctly held that the
impact of the spider's bite was not caused by negligence.94
The Third District Court of Appeal decided a premises liability action in
Longmore v. Saga Bay Property Owners Ass'n 95 a case in which the plain-
tiff's sixteen-year-old child drowned in a man-made lake owned by appel-
lee. 96 The parents claimed that the appellee knew that its lake had a precipi-
tous drop-off from less than sixty-nine inches to over forty feet, which cre-
ated a duty to either "warn or provide life guards to protect children from this
'exceptionally dangerous concealed peril."' 97 The court refused to find that a
sudden drop-off constituted a dangerous condition or trap because such a
condition was also characteristic of conditions existing in natural lakes.98
The court also rejected the parents' argument that, because the defendant had
previously been sued, it had a duty to warn because of its superior knowl-
edge of the drop.99 The court held that such a warning was not required be-
cause the drop "did not constitute a concealed dangerous condition."'"
In Weissberg v. Albertson's, Inc.,'0 l the Fourth District addressed the
breadth of the "dangerous instrumentality doctrine" in a case involving an
injury suffered by the plaintiff, who was struck by a "powerized" shopping
cart in the defendant's grocery store."02 The court considered the appropri-
ateness of dismissal of the complaint by the trial court.10 3 The appellate court
noted that, although Florida's relevant statute prevented defendant from be-
ing liable for the negligence of the operator of the shopping cart, it did not
prevent Albertson's from being liable for its own negligence in entrusting the
92. St. Joseph's Hosp., 891 So. 2d at 1042.
93. Id. at 1042-43.
94. Id. at 1043.
95. 868 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
96. Id. at 1268.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1270.
99. Id.
100. Longmore, 868 So. 2d at 1270.
101. 886 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
102. Id. at 306.
103. Id. at 307.
2005]
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cart.' °4 Further, the court held that the defendant could be held liable under a
premises liability theory, which the plaintiff alleged was violated by a failure
to provide safety warning devices."' 5
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also decided another premises li-
ability case in Burns International Security Services Inc. of Florida v. Phila-
delphia Indemnity Insurance Co.,1°6 which dealt with a final judgment in a
case dealing with liability for a theft. 10 7 Defendant Burns was the security
company for Parkway Commerce Center, in which D & H Distributing Cor-
poration (D & H) was a tenant insured by Philadelphia Indemnity for a theft
that occurred at D & H's warehouse space. 0 8 Burns argued on appeal that it
had no duty to secure the premises until there was evidence of similar prior
criminal activity.' °9 After noting the various categories of cases involving
premises liability, the court noted that the duty of security providers arises
from a different basis." ° The court correctly noted that the security provider
contracts to provide security, and thus should not be able to argue that it is
not liable for a criminal act simply because it was the first of its type upon
the premises."'
The Bums case also dealt with an issue of the proper apportionment of
fault between parties pursuant to section 768.81 of the Florida Statutes."2
The verdict form also included two prior parties who had been voluntarily
dismissed from the action, whom the jury also determined to be at fault." 3
The court noted that it should "'first determine the amount of damages for
which Burns is liable based upon its own percentage of fault."' 14 Because
Burns was found forty-five percent at fault, the court should then add the
amount for which it was jointly liable, up to an additional $500,000. "'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also considered a premises liability
case that involved the scope of duty of a security company in Robert-Blier v.
Statewide Enterprises, Inc. 116 This case involved a lawsuit against a security
company hired by a condominium association "to provide one unarmed
104. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.093(2) (2002)).
105. Id.
106. 899 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
107. Id. at 362-63.
108. Id. at 363.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 364.
111. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs. Inc. of Fla., 899 So. 2d at 365.
112. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (2004).
113. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs. Inc. of Fla., 899 So. 2d at 365.
114. Id. at 367.
115. Id.
116. 890 So. 2d 522, 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
[Vol. 30:1:75
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guard to patrol the community . . . to escort residents to their homes upon
request, and to observe and report suspicious incidents."' 17 A visitor to one
of the buildings "was forced into her car, driven off the premises, and
raped."'1 18 The court noted that the association "owed a duty to visitors to
protect or warn them of known dangers in the common areas," but that it had
only contracted "for the appearance of security" with this security com-
pany.19 Although it rejected the defendant's argument that it owed no duty
to the plaintiff, the court was unwilling to hold that the company had as-
sumed the association's broad duty to protect invitees, but instead held the
company only had a duty to provide the services contractually agreed
upon. 1
20
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the liability of social
hosts in Estate of Massad v. Granzow.12 ' This case involved a claim by the
Estate of Roger P. Massad, who was a guest in Dee Janet Granzow's
home. 122 Massad became drunk, in part on alcoholic beverages served by
Granzow, and fell and struck his head in the home "sustaining a concussion
with significant bleeding."' 23 "Granzow gave Massad a prescription pill not
prescribed for his use, which worsened his intoxication.' 24 She abandoned
him next to an unfenced pool, into which he later fell and drowned.
125
Granzow argued that section 768.125 of the Florida Statutes, which
provides immunity for serving alcohol to guests, should be available to social
hosts, as well as vendors of alcohol.1 26 The court agreed that both the com-
mon law and the statute shield social hosts from liability for "dispensing or
furnishing alcohol.' 27 However, pursuant to the theory found in section 324
of the Second Restatement of Torts, the court noted that the defendant was
not entitled to dismissal of the complaint because she could still be held li-
able based upon her conduct when she 'took charge of Massad,' when he
was helpless and unable to adequately aid or protect himself."'' 28
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 523.
120. Id. at 524.
121. 886 So. 2d 1050, 1051 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Massad, 886 So. 2d at 1052 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.125 (2003)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1052-53. Section 324 states, in part:
One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless adequately to
aid or protect himself is subject to liability to the other for any bodily harm caused to him by
20051
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V. NURSING HOME LIABILITY
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the interplay between Flor-
ida's Wrongful Death Act and Florida's statute covering nursing home Pa-
tient's Bill of Rights in Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc.12 9 The
case was filed by the personal representative of Gladstone Knowles, who
died from severe bedsores and other ailments while residing at the defen-
dant's nursing home. 30 The trial court granted summary judgment for the
defendant on the claim based upon violation of the Patient's Bill of Rights'
statute because none of the statutory violations caused the death.' 3' The case
proceeded to trial upon a common law negligence theory, but after the ver-
dict, the court ruled "that it had erred in granting a summary judgment on the
statutory claim."' 132 The Fourth District Court of Appeal, sitting en banc,
held that the trial court was initially correct in dismissing the statutory
claim.133 The relevant statutory section stated:
Any resident whose rights... are deprived or infringed upon shall
have a cause of action against any licensee responsible for the vio-
lation. The action may be brought by the resident ... or by the
personal representative of the estate of a deceased resident when
the cause of death resulted from the deprivation or infringement of
the decedent's rights.' 34
The import of this decision has been lessened by statutory amendments
during the pendency of the legislation that have added language indicating
that the representative may file an action for violation of the resident's rights
"regardless of the cause of death."'135 The Supreme Court of Florida held that
the plain meaning of the language prevented the action and rejected argu-
ments that its conclusion wrongfully failed to consider the language in con-
(a) the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the other
while within the actor's charge, or
(b) the actor's discontinuing his aid or protection, if by so doing he leaves the other in
a worse position than when the actor took charge of him.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965).
129. 898 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 2004).
130. Id. at 2-3.
131. Id. at 3.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Beverly Enterprises-Fla., Inc. v. Knowles, 766 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
134. FLA. STAT. § 400.023(1) (1997).
135. FLA. STAT. § 400.023(1) (2004).
[Vol. 30:1:75
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cert with the Survival Statute and Wrongful Death Acts. 36 The concurring
opinion of Justice Cantero137 and the dissenting opinion by Justice Lewis
138
provide an interesting debate concerning the role of the court in referring to
legislative intent when the language of the statute is arguably ambiguous.
139
As the opinions exemplify, this old canard of statutory construction depends
upon the willingness to accept that language as ambiguous.
The First District Court of Appeal considered damages issues in nursing
home cases in Estate of Williams v. Tandem Health Care of Florida, Inc. 140
This case was brought by the estate of Lucille Williams, who fell while a
resident of the defendant nursing home and later died as a result.' 4' The es-
tate brought an action alleging infringement of a resident's rights and wrong-
ful death under the appropriate statutes. 142 Pursuant to new rulings issued by
the Supreme Court of Florida,143 the court ordered a new trial because it
deemed that those rulings precluded non-economic damages to survivors
resulting from medical malpractice.44 The estate argued that damages avail-
able to heirs under the wrongful death statute should be incorporated under
the resident's rights provision. 145 The court disagreed, noting that the statute
refers to the rights of the resident and refused to add or imply that survivors'
rights to damages are also available under that statute.
146
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also decided a case involving nurs-
ing home negligence in Carr v. Personacare of Pompano East, Inc., 4 which
considered an appeal of a complaint dismissal. 48 The court reversed the trial
court decision that chapter 400 remedies preclude a common law negligence
action.149 This decision is consistent with a relatively recent Supreme Court
of Florida decision. 1
50
The Fifth District Court of Appeal also considered a nursing home resi-
dent's rights case in Extendicare Health Services, Inc. v. Estate of Patter-
136. Knowles, 898 So. 2d at 8-10.
137. See id. at I 1-14 (Cantero, J., concurring).
138. See id. at 14-25 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
139. See id. at 11-25 (Cantero, J., concurring; Lewis, J., dissenting).
140. 899 So. 2d 369, 371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 372.
143. See, e.g., Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So. 2d 998, 1002 (Fla. 2003).
144. Williams, 899 So. 2d at 373.
145. Id. at 374.
146. Id. at 374-75.
147. 890 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
148. Id. at 289.
149. Id.
150. See Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842, 852 (Fla. 2003).
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son, '5 in which the decedent was alleged to have died as a result of the dep-
rivation of rights.1 52 Extendicare, the alleged operator of the home, appealed
the trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration.' 53 The arbitration
provision appeared in a contract between the alleged operator and owner of
the nursing home and the manager of the home. 4 Extendicare argued "that
their only connection to the nursing home was through this agreement" and
the financial support that they provided the manager.'55 The court ruled that
since the deceased was not a party to the contract, nor an intended third party
beneficiary, he could not be bound by its arbitration provision even though it
arguably provided a basis for Extendicare's responsibility because the suit
was brought pursuant to statutory and negligence claims.'
5 6
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered an appeal of a nursing
home liability claim in Jackson v. York Hannover Nursing Centers. 57 The
claim was filed by the personal representative of a nursing home patient who
died three weeks after admission to the nursing home. 8 The defendants
claimed that the death occurred because the medical center from which she
was transferred "was negligent in its care and treatment," and they subse-
quently placed the medical center on the verdict form even though it was not
a party. 59 The plaintiffs expert then testified that the medical center's care
fell below the standard of care.' 6° The court held that the trial court properly
permitted the jury to apportion damages because there was only a single in-
jury to which both parties contributed, as opposed to two distinguishable
injuries. 161
VI. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS
The Supreme Court of Florida decided a case concerning emotional dis-
tress injuries in a claim of the tort of negligent interference with parental
rights in Southern Baptist Hospital of Florida, Inc. v. Welker. 62 In this case,
the plaintiff filed an action against a psychologist employed by the defendant
151. 898 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
152. Id. at 990.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Extendicare Health Servs., Inc., 898 So. 2d at 990.
157. 876 So. 2d 8,9 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
158. ld. at 9-10.
159. Id. at 10.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 13.
162. 908 So. 2d 317, 318 (Fla. 2005).
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hospital, which gave an opinion to a court that the appellant had abused his
children while in his custody, which resulted in an injunction removing cus-
tody of his minor children from him to his former wife and denied him ac-
cess to the children. 63 The court declined to answer the certified question as
to whether the impact rule precludes recovery for emotional injuries in an
action for negligently interfering with parental rights because the courts be-
low had not addressed whether an action for negligent interference with pa-
rental rights exists.t 64 Although the court acknowledged that it had previ-
ously determined that Florida recognizes an intentional interference with
parental rights cause of action, it still declined to indicate whether it would
recognize an action for negligent interference with parental rights. 1
65
The First District Court of Appeal addressed a case dealing with an
emotional distress claim in Hernandez v. Tallahassee Medical Center, Inc.
166
Ms. Hernandez, a surgical nurse, appealed the dismissal of her complaint
against her employer which stated that the defendant was aware that she suf-
fered from an epileptic-seizure disorder that her neurologist had advised pre-
vented her from driving to work.167 The hospital, which informed her that
her job was in jeopardy because of missed work, instructed her to take a taxi
and obtain reimbursement for travel to and from work while on call. 168 The
plaintiff called work, claiming to be sick, but was told to come "right away",
although they were allegedly aware that she would be forced to drive to work
herself. 69 As she drove to work, she "suffered a seizure, lost control of her
car, and suffered serious and permanent injuries" as a result. 7° The court
found that ordering an employee to work right away, despite awareness of
her suffering from a serious condition, "did not exceed all bounds of de-
cency" as required for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 7' Of per-
haps even more importance was the finding by the court that the employer
did not have a duty to its employee to avert the harm for negligence pur-
poses. 172 The court noted that driving to work was normally outside the
scope of employment and that awareness of the threatened harm did not cre-
ate a duty. 173 The court also noted that the demand to come to work, did not
163. Id. at318-19.
164. Id. at 320.
165. Id.
166. 896 So. 2d 839, 840 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 840-41.
170. Id. at 841.
171. Hernandez, 896 So. 2d at 841.
172. Id. at 842.
173. Id. at 842-43.
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include an express order to drive to work and that the plaintiff could have
chosen to decline to come to work or to seek other means of transportation.
74
The First District also decided an emotional distress claim in the area of
veterinary malpractice in Kennedy v. Byas.17 ' The plaintiff, Robert Kennedy,
filed an action for veterinary malpractice and emotional distress based upon
the treatment received for his pet basset hound. 176 The defendant won a par-
tial summary judgment motion on the emotional distress claim and moved
for transfer of venue to county court from circuit court because the remaining
damages for the malpractice claim were under the jurisdictional limit for
circuit court. 77 The court accepted the plaintiff's writ of certiorari to quash
the order of transfer so that the substantive issue could be reached. 178 The
court refused to abandon the impact rule for this veterinary malpractice
case. 179 Acknowledging that the Supreme Court of Florida permitted dam-
ages to be recovered in a case involving the malicious destruction of a dog in
La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc. 180 and that other jurisdictions are
split on the issue of permitting recovery of emotional distress claims for neg-
ligent provision of veterinary care, the court opted to not permit an exception
to the impact rule out of fear of placing an unnecessary burden on courts by
expanding this tort.' 8'
The Third District Court of Appeal dealt with an emotional distress
claim in LeGrande v. Emmanuel, 82 in which "a Baptist minister.., sued two
congregational members ... for slander, slander per se, negligent infliction
of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of
consortium.' ' 83 The Pastor's complaint, which was dismissed, alleged that
his congregation members had accused him of stealing money from the
church to purchase a Mercedes and "referred to [him] as 'Satan' and
'Makout,"' a name typically used for oppressive secret police from Duva-
lier's regime. 84 The court correctly reversed the dismissal of the slander and
slander per se claims because the minister alleged that he was falsely accused
of criminal acts, which are actionable per se.' 85 The court also correctly up-
174. Id. at 844.
175. 867 So. 2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1196-97.
178. Id. at 1196.
179. Id. at 1198.
180. 163 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964).
181. Kennedy, 867 So. 2d at 1198.
182. 889 So. 2d 991, 993 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 994.
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held the dismissal of the infliction of emotional distress claims because it
deemed the comments to not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous con-
duct as to satisfy the requirements for an intentional infliction claim and be-
cause his allegations of memory loss and aggravation of a pre-existing dia-
betic condition were wholly insufficient for a negligent infliction action.,
86
The Third District also considered an emotional distress claim in Wil-
liams v. Worldwide Flight Services Inc.,187 which involved an appeal of a
dismissal of an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and neg-
ligent retention.188 The complaint alleged that the plaintiff was exposed to
intentionally discriminatory behavior by his general manager on the basis of
race. 89 Amongst other complaints, the plaintiff alleged that he was called a
"nigger" and a "monkey" as well as being subjected to false accusations of
theft.' 9 The court found that the behavior did not rise to the level of outra-
geousness to permit recovery. 91 Whether this is accurate in the abstract is
debatable, but the court did correctly note that the federal and state employ-
ment discrimination statutes are available to remedy such conduct.
192
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also considered a negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress claim in Thomas v. Ob/Gyn Specialists of the Palm
Beaches, Inc., 9 which dealt with an appeal of summary judgment against
the plaintiff. 94 The case involved a claim by the husband for the alleged
malpractice of a doctor who performed a D & C (dilatation and curettage)
procedure upon the plaintiffs pregnant wife. 95 The existence of the fetus
had not been diagnosed and did not survive the procedure. 196 The court re-
fused to expand the abrogation of the impact rule in this line of cases,197 dis-
tinguishing it from the wrongful stillbirth exception recognized by the Su-
preme Court of Florida in Tanner v. Hartog.'98
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal also considered Florida law in re-
lation to an emotional distress claim in Gonzalez-Jiminez De Ruiz v. United
186. Id. at 994-95.
187. 877 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
188. Id. at 869-70.
189. Id. at 870.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Williams, 877 So. 2d at 871.
193. 889 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
194. Id. at 971.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 972.
198. 696 So. 2d 705, 708 (Fla. 1997).
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States,'99 a case brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act by survivors of a
prisoner who died from cancer. °° In dismissing the infliction of emotional
distress claims by the children of the prisoner and his alleged common-law
wife, the court noted that substandard medical care, failure to provide access
to the deceased while he was ill, failure to inform the family of his death, and
delay in transporting his remains did not constitute intentional infliction.20 '
The court also held that, without physical injury, it could not recognize a
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.
202
VII. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in an en banc decision, reversed
the dismissal of a medical malpractice complaint in Burke v. Snyder,2 °3 in
which the plaintiff alleged that she was the victim of a sexual battery during
a medical examination by the defendant at the Nova Southeastern University
Osteopathic Treatment Center.2' The plaintiff alleged that Nova was vicari-
ously liable for the doctor's conduct and also negligent in hiring, supervising,
and retaining him in its employ, but "the plaintiff did not comply with the
notice and pre-suit screening requirements for medical malpractice actions
[n]or file suit within the two-year statute of limitations for such [actions]. 2 5
Noting that it had decided to the contrary in an earlier opinion, O'Shea v.
Phillips,°6 it also acknowledged that other district courts had disagreed with
its interpretation of the relevant Florida Statutes, including Florida Statutes
section 766.110.207 It receded from its prior decision because it deemed that
the sexual misconduct did not arise "out of the rendering of... medical care
or services. 2 8
The Fourth District also decided an appeal of a medical malpractice
claim in Grobman v. Posey,2 9 a case involving the right of non-settling de-
199. 378 F.3d 1229 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
200. Id. at 1230 & n.1.
201. Id. at 1231.
202. Id. (citing Holt v. Rowell, 798 So. 2d 767, 770 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
203. 899 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (en banc).
204. Id. at 337.
205. Id.
206. 746 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), reh'g denied, 767 So. 2d 459 (Fla.
2000).
207. Burke, 899 So. 2d at 337-39; FLA. STAT. § 766.110 (1997).
208. Burke, 899 So. 2d at 338 (quoting O'Shea, 746 So. 2d at 1109 (quoting FLA. STAT. §
766.106(1)(a) (1993))) (internal quotations omitted).
209. 863 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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fendants to obtain a setoff for amounts paid by a settling defendant.2 '0 The
case involved a malpractice claim against a number of physicians, an anes-
thesiologist, a hospital, and Prudential Insurance Company, which provided
HMO (Health Management Organization) coverage.21 Two of the physi-
cians and Prudential settled with the plaintiff before trial.212 Prudential was
sued under vicarious liability and negligent credentialing theories, but the
settlement did not indicate the causes of action, nor did it allocate between
economic and non-economic damages.21 3 At trial, the remaining defendants,
Dr. Grobman and Mercy Hospital, asked for the jury to apportion fault to the
other physicians and anesthesiologist, but not the HMO/health insurer.2 4 In
order to resolve the dispute, the court was forced to consider the applicability
of section 768.81, which "eliminates joint and several liability for non-
economic damages and limits joint and several liability for economic dam-
ages. '21 5 However, vicarious liability would not result in apportionment be-
cause the vicariously liable party is liable for all of the harm caused by the
primary actor.1 6 Furthermore, the court ruled that the negligent credential-
ing claim was derivative in nature and therefore, like vicarious liability,
would not require apportionment of damages.1 7 Therefore, the court held
that Prudential was not a proper Fabre defendant to be placed on the verdict
form, and its payment required a complete set-off against the verdict under
sections 46.015 and 768.041 of the Florida Statutes.
218
VIII. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the issue of sovereign immu-
nity in Pollock v. Florida Department of Highway Patrol,21 9 an appeal of two
actions brought by the survivors of a deceased driver and passenger of a car
that "collided into the back of an unlit tractor-trailer which had stalled...
[on] the Palmetto Expressway. '20 A driver had earlier called 911 and was
transferred to the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP), informing a dispatcher of
210. Id. at 1232.
211. Id. at 1232-33.
212. Id. at 1233.
213. Id.
214. Grobman, 863 So. 2d at 1233.
215. Id. at 1234 (citing D'Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003)).
216. Id. at 1235.
217. Id. at 1235-36.
218. Id. at 1237.
219. 882 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2004).
220. Id. at 930.
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the existence of the hazard in the highway.22' He was informed by the dis-
patcher that a unit would be dispatched, but apparently the dispatcher failed
to enter the call into the computer for assignment.222 FHP has internal opera-
tional rules requiring the dispatch of a trooper to the scene of a stalled vehi-
cle, and evidence at trial revealed that officers were available. 2 3 Its rules
also indicate that crash prevention and crash investigation are primary func-
tions of the FHP.224 The trial courts in both cases entered judgments for the
plaintiffs, but the decisions were reversed by the Third District Court of Ap-
peal, which certified a conflict with decisions by the Second District.225
As noted by the Supreme Court of Florida, Florida has waived sover-
eign immunity in tort actions "'for any act for which a private person under
similar circumstances would be held liable.' 226 The issue before the court
was whether the FHP owed a common law or statutory duty to the plain-
tiffs. 2 7 Although the court acknowledged the duty of a public or private
entity that owns, operates, or controls property to maintain it and to warn of
and correct dangerous conditions thereon,228 it held that FHP was not bound
because it lacked ownership or control over the highways. 229 The court noted
that the operation and maintenance of the roads is the province of the Florida
Department of Transportation and the local governments in which the roads
are located and that Florida law permits, but does not require, FHP to remove
stalled or abandoned vehicles from state highways.23° It also opined that the
responsibility of enforcing laws for the public good does not create a duty
towards a particular individual, absent the officers becoming directly in-
volved in circumstances that place a person within a "zone of risk., 231' The
court examined a number of instances in which a special duty could arise and
found that this situation did not fit within any of them.2 32 It also rejected the
argument that the internal procedures created an independent duty of care.233
221. Id. at 931.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 931.
225. Id. at 931-32.
226. Id. at 932 (quoting Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So. 2d 532, 534-35 (Fla. 1999)).
227. Id. at 933-34.
228. Id. at 933 (citing Bailey Drainage Dist. v. Stark, 526 So. 2d 678, 681 (Fla. 1988)).
229. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 934 (citing Alderman v. Lamar, 493 So. 2d 495, 498 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 935-36. (citing Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 735 (Fla. 1989); Everton v.
Willard, 468 So. 2d 936, 938 (Fla. 1985)).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 936-37.
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Justice Pariente dissented, arguing that FHP's actions were operational
in nature and therefore not within the protection of sovereign immunity.2 3
She argued that the general duty/special duty dichotomy had been abandoned
after the passage of section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes.35 Although ac-
knowledging that some decisions seem to have receded from this abandon-
ment, she argues that the court should focus on conventional tort principles,
particularly foreseeability 6 Justice Pariente argued that because the FHP
assured the caller that a unit would be sent, it therefore assumed control over
the situation and its failure to so respond created a foreseeable "zone of risk"
of harm.237
The First District Court of Appeal also addressed sovereign immunity in
Rudloe v. Karl,238 an action in which a Florida State alumnus and the corpo-
ration of which he was president and "closely affiliated" sued Florida State
University (FSU) and another alumnus for statements made in the FSU De-
partment of Oceanography Newsletter.239 The newsletter in question in-
cluded responses to the Department's request for students to relate their ex-
periences of departmental history.24 One of the experiences was an account
by Dr. Karl that Rudloe may have stolen a priceless specimen from the de-
partment.24 The plaintiffs' second amended complaint alleged that FSU was
negligent in failing to verify the facts contained in Dr. Karl's submission to
the newsletter. 42 The court held that sovereign immunity was not a bar to
the action because it did not involve basic law enforcement or governmental
policy making, nor discretionary planning or judgment.243
The Fifth District Court of Appeal decided a sovereign immunity issue
in City of Ocala v. Graham,244 a case involving a claim that a woman was
shot because of the negligence of one of the city's police officers. 245 Appel-
lant called the Ocala police to complain about a death threat from her former
husband.246 She alleged that the officer agreed that he, or someone else from
234. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 939 (Pariente, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 940 (citing Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010,
1016 (Fla. 1979)).
236. Id. at 941.
237. Id. at 942 (citing McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1992)).
238. 899 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
239. Id. at 1162-63.
240. Id. at 1163.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Rudloe, 899 So. 2d at 1164.
244. 864 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
245. Id. at 474-76.
246. Id. at 475.
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the department, would talk to her former husband, which she believed would
deter him from carrying out his threat.247 Two days later, the appellant en-
gaged in three different conversations with her husband, and she acknowl-
edged that she realized that no one from the police department had contacted
him. 248 The estranged husband appeared at her residence, got into a fist fight
with their adult son and shot at the son, hitting the appellant instead.249
The court first noted that "there is no common law duty to prevent the
misconduct of third persons.,250 The court observed that in relation to law
enforcement and public safety, "sovereign immunity may disappear" if a
special relationship exists between the victim and the governmental offi-
cial.25' In looking at the required elements for such a relationship, the court
held that the appellant could not establish justifiable reliance upon the offi-
cer's assurance that he would talk to the assailant and that the failure to con-
tact the estranged husband was not the proximate cause of the appellee's
injuries. 2 First, the court noted that the threats occurred in a jurisdiction
outside of the control of the Ocala Police Department and that the officer
informed the appellant of the appropriate law enforcement authority to con-
tact.253 In addition, it found that it was sheer speculation to posit that the
officer's failure to contact the assailant caused the harm and the physical
attack by the adult son upon the estranged husband was a superseding cause
of the injuries.254
IX. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
The Second District Court of Appeal resolved a tortious interference
with a business relationship issue in Advantage Digital Systems, Inc. v. Digi-
tal Imaging Services, Inc.25' The appeal arose from an injunction obtained
by Digital Imaging (Digital) against three of its former employees who were
subsequently employed by Advantage Digital (Advantage), which was in-
corporated by one of the employees and a customer of Digital Imaging. 6
The court ruled that the injunction was too broad against the former employ-
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Graham, 864 So. 2d at 475-76.
250. Id. at 476 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 315 (1965)).
251. Id. at 476-77 (citing Trianon Park Condo. Ass'n v. City of Haileah, 468 So. 2d 912,
921 (Fla. 1985)).
252. Id. at 477.
253. Id. at 478.
254. Graham, 864 So. 2d at 478-79.
255. 870 So. 2d 111, 114 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
256. Id.
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ees who had signed a non-competition agreement to not solicit Digital cus-
tomers because it extended beyond a ban on solicitation, it restrained solici-
tation of prospective customers, and it extended beyond two years without
evidence overcoming the statutory presumption pursuant to Florida Statutes
section 542.335(1)(d)(1)257 that restraints in excess of that time period are
unreasonable.258 In relation to the injunction against former employee Mi-
chael Knaus, who had not signed a non-competition agreement, the court
reversed the injunction restraining him from doing business with Digital cus-
tomers because of the assumption that he had sabotaged Digital's machines
while working as an independent contractor for Digital.2 59 Because Knaus
had ended his relationship with Digital and therefore could no longer sabo-
tage the machines, the court found the injunction to be an inappropriate rem-
edy because the alleged harm had already occurred. 26" The court then re-
versed the injunction against Advantage because it could permissibly com-
pete for business, unless it was inducing a breach of a contract not terminable
at will.2 61 It did note that Advantage could not assist the former employees to
breach their non-competition agreements with Digital and that an injunction
to that effect would be permissible. 62
An appeal of a dismissal of a "tortious interference with a business rela-
tionship" claim was decided by the Third District Court of Appeal in Rubin
v. Alarcon.263 In the case, the plaintiff law firm undertook representation of
Benito Santiago against Morena Monge.264 Defendant Alarcon, a mutual
friend of Santiago and Monge, proceeded to act as Monge's agent in settling
the case with Santiago.265 In the second amended complaint, the plaintiffs
allege that Alarcon urged Santiago not to tell his attorneys about the negotia-
tions, but instead to tell them that he no longer wanted to pursue the law-
suit.266 In addition, it was alleged that Santiago was urged to not disclose the
payments made to him in settlement of the case.2 67 Although acknowledging
that parties may settle cases without attorney intervention, the court held that
they may not engage in fraud or collusion in order to interfere with the
257. FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(d)(1) (2000).
258. Id.; Advantage Digital Sys., Inc., 870 So. 2d at 114-15.
259. Advantage Digital Sys., Inc., 870 So. 2d at 115-16.
260. Id. at 116.
261. Id. at 116-17.
262. Id. at 116.
263. 892 So. 2d 501, 501 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 502.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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agreement between the attorney and client.268 The court also noted in dicta,
however, that a provision in the contingent fee agreement that the client
could not settle the case without prior written approval of the law firm was
void.269
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also considered a case involving
tortious interference of a contract for attorneys' fees in Ingalsbe v. Stewart
Agency, Inc. 270 The trial court dismissed the complaint on the basis of abso-
lute immunity. 271 In the case, the lawyers "were retained by their client to
sue appellees [Stewart Agency] under the Lemon Law. 272 The client won a
jury verdict, which was reversed on appeal.273 After remand, the appellees
approached the client and urged settlement without involving the lawyers.274
The appellees and client then agreed on how much the appellees would pay
in attorneys' fees to the appellants, which met only one of the alternatives
available in the fee agreement between the client and the appellants.275 The
appellees argued that the appellant's claim was barred by the "litigation
privilege. 27 6 This privilege has been defined as one that applies to "any act
occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding.277 However, as the
court noted, although the appellee was privileged to propose and conclude a
settlement, it was not entitled "to interfere with a fee contract between one of
the settling parties and his lawyer. '271 Judge Gross dissented, arguing that
the decision "impinge[d] on a client's right to settle a lawsuit," noting that
the settlement far exceeded the damages awarded at the initial trial2 79 The
dissent argued that the settlement did comply with one of the alternatives in
the fee contract and did not involve a design or defeat payment of attorney's
fees.28° Upon a motion for rehearing, the court did certify the following
question to the Supreme Court of Florida:
Does the litigation privilege of Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Tho-
mas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. United State Fire Insurance Co.,
268. Rubin, 892 So. 2d at 503.
269. Id. at 504 n.5.
270. 869 So. 2d 30,31 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Ingalsbe, 869 So. 2d at 31.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 32 (quoting Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v.
U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994)).
278. Id. at 33.
279. Id. at 35-36 (Gross, J., dissenting).
280. Ingalsbe, 869 So. 2d at 36.
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639 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1994), apply to claims alleging direct inter-
ference with an attorney's fee earned by representing a con-
sumer's claim for unfair or deceptive practices in a sale of a motor
vehicle, where the interference arose from a seller-initiated settle-
ment without counsel in which the fee due the lawyer was reduced
without the lawyer's consent.
281
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered an appeal of an injunction
involving a "tortious interference with business relationships" claim in Ani-
mal Rights Foundation of Florida, Inc. v. Siegel.282 Plaintiff Siegel was
president of a timeshare development that hired a production company to
conduct entertainment for potential buyers that included twice weekly animal
shows. 283  The complaint alleged that defendant foundation's supporters
picketed at the plaintiff's residential community and business offices as well
as circulated leaflets that claimed Siegel abused animals n.2 8  The court ruled
that the injunction's prohibition on picketing that would impede the flow of
traffic was improper in light of a lack of record evidence that "the Founda-
tion had impeded or was likely to impede the free flow of traffic. 285 It also
ruled that the noise restrictions were an improper burden on speech "because
they enjoin[ed] all shouting and all uses of bull horns or megaphones, rather
than tailoring a prohibition against impermissible conduct.' 28 6 Additionally,
the court invalidated restrictions on the number of protestors and location of
demonstrations absent evidence showing the need for such regulation.287 It
also struck bans on videotaping passers-by because of a failure to demon-
strate irreparable harm.288 Furthermore, it struck parts of the injunction that
banned certain statements from being made. 289 Finally, the court noted that
because the speech involved was pure speech and because the foundation
was not a competitor of Siegel or the development and it was not promoting
an economic interest, the speech "was not properly restrained to prevent the
tortious interference alleged. ' 290 In a partial concurrence and dissent, Chief
Judge Sawaya argued that the conduct engaged in by the defendant was har-
281. Id. at 38-39.
282. 867 So. 2d 451, 452-53 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004). The case also involved claims
of "invasion of privacy, slander, and libel." Id. at 453.
283. Id. at 452.
284. Id. at 453.
285. Id. at 455.
286. Siegel, 867 So. 2d at 456.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 457.
290. Id. at 458 (footnote omitted).
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assment as opposed to speech 291 and that some of the speech was not politi-
cal, but commercial in nature.292
X. "SLAvIN" DOCTRINE
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the application of the
Slavin doctrine in Gonsalves v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. 293 The plaintiff's
mother purchased carpeting for her staircase from Sears, which was installed
by its contractor, Flamingo.294 The first installation was incorrect and had to
be replaced.295 A problem became apparent after the second installation,
which the mother made several unsuccessful attempts to get rectified.296 She
was reassured by Sears that it would remedy the problem so she did not seek
an independent company to repair the problem.2 97 Before the problem was
remedied, she "fell on the staircase sustaining [a] serious injury., 298 The trial
court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by Sears and Flamingo
pursuant to the Slavin doctrine. 299 This doctrine refers to the case of Slavin v.
Kay300 and holds that "a contractor is relieved of liability for damages caused
by a patent defect after control of the completed premises has been turned
over to the owner."3 °1 The court noted that this case involved a patent defect,
but held that it could not be conclusively established that the work was ever
completed.30 2 It also noted that this case did not really fit into the rationale of
Slavin, as Sears had actually been asked to fix the problem. 30 3
In Foreline Security Corp. v. Scott,3° the Fifth District Court of Appeal
also applied the Slavin doctrine. 3°  This case involved liability for a 1999
bank robbery.30 6 "Foreline installed a bank security system at the Mount
Dora branch of the United Southern Bank (USB) in 1993. "307 Scott, who was
291. Siegel, 867 So. 2d at 464 (Sawaya, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
292. Id. at 468.
293. 859 So. 2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Gonsalves, 859 So. 2d at 1208.
299. Id.
300. 108 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1958).
301. Gonsalves, 859 So. 2d at 1209.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 871 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
305. Id. at 909.
306. Id. at 908.
307. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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a teller at the bank at the time of the robbery, was shot and rendered a quad-
riplegic as a result.3"8 Scott sued Foreline, alleging several causes of ac-
tion." 9 The jury found that Foreline was fifty percent at fault and that USB
was fifty percent at fault for the injury, but the trial court entered judgment
against Foreline for the full amount of the damages pursuant to section
768.81 of the Florida Statutes.3 0 The court first noted that a majority of
states have adopted a "completed and accepted rule" for this type of factual
situation.31' Having completed installation of the security system six years
prior to the robbery, Foreline argued that it should have received a jury in-
struction on the Slavin doctrine.1 2 The court agreed.3 13 The court also held
that it was error to instruct the jury to allocate fault between USB and Fore-
line and then ignore the allocation as the jury may have decided differently
had it been aware that Foreline would bear responsibility for the entire
amount of the verdict.314
XI. MISCELLANEOUS
In Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. American Aviation,
Inc.,31 the Supreme Court of Florida responded to certified questions of law
concerning the economic loss rule from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit.31 6 Indemnity Insurance Company (Indemnity) and
Profile Aviation Services, Inc. (Profile) sued American Aviation (American)
for negligent maintenance and inspection of an aircraft's landing gear on a
Profile aircraft.317 The court noted that the economic loss rule, which prohib-
its tort actions in certain cases where the only damages are economic losses,
is applied to those in contractual privity to prevent the circumvention of the
allocation of such losses set forth in the contract. 38 Thus, it would be inap-
propriate to permit a tort action where the only breach of duty was a breach
of the contract.31 9 Similarly, the products liability economic loss rule devel-
oped in order to prevent manufacturers from being held liable for economic
308. Id.
309. Scott, 871 So. 2d at 908.
310. Id. at 908-09.
311. Id. at 909 (footnote omitted).
312. Id. at909-10.
313. Id. at 910.
314. Scott, 871 So. 2d at 911.
315. 891 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2004).
316. Id. at 534.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 536.
319. Id. at 537.
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damages beyond that provided for by warranty law.3 20 The latter limitation
has generally been applied to products which damage themselves as a result
of a defect in the product.32' The court held that the economic loss rule did
not apply in this case where the plaintiffs were not in privity and noted that it
continued to recognize the "other property" exception to products liability
economic loss cases.322
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ginsberg,323 the Supreme Court of Florida
decided an invasion of privacy claim.324 The case was responsive to several
certified questions of law from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals involv-
ing claims by Elaine Scarfo that, while employed by corporations owned by
Victor Ginsberg, she was subjected to "unwelcome offensive conduct, in-
cluding physical touching and comments of a sexual nature.,3 5 Amongst the
claims brought by Scarfo was a claim of invasion of privacy, and the case
required a resolution of whether this conduct fit within that tort as recognized
in Florida.326 The court held that the tort does not include this type of intru-
sion to the plaintiff's body as opposed to physical space or holding the per-
son free from public gaze.32 7
The First District Court of Appeal also considered a warning issue in
McGraw v. R & R Investments, Ltd.328 In this case, Patricia McGraw ap-
pealed from a final summary judgment finding R & R, an equine activity
sponsor, not liable for injuries that she suffered as an equine trainer em-
ployed by R & R after she was thrown by a horse owned by R & R. 329 The
resolution of the case depended upon analysis of the immunity provided to
equine sponsors by section 773.02 of the Florida Statutes.330 Section 773.04
requires that equine sponsors post notices and give written warnings an-
nouncing that the sponsor is not liable for injuries from inherent risks of
equine activities, but provides no consequences for failure to provide such
warnings. 33' The court reversed the summary judgment, holding that the
320. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 891 So. 2d at 538.
321. Id. at 542 (citing Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 984 (Fla. 1999) (Wells, J.,
concurring)).
322. Id. at 543.
323. 863 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2003).
324. Id. at 157.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 158.
327. Id. at 162.
328. 877 So. 2d 886, 888 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 889 (citing FLA. STAT. § 773.04 (2000)).
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statutory obligation to provide the notice was mandatory if the sponsor was
to be afforded the statutory immunity.332
In Hopkins v. Boat Club, Inc. ," the First District Court of Appeal con-
sidered an appeal of a case involving a release.334 This case, filed by Ruby
and Ronald Hopkins, involved injuries suffered by Mrs. Hopkins when she
was thrown from a boat operated by Mr. Hopkins under the direction and
supervision of one of the boat club's employees.335 The plaintiffs signed an
agreement with the boat club for use of the club's boats and then signed in-
dividual releases which included a clause entitled "Assumption and Ac-
knowledgment of Risks and Release of Liability Agreement. ' 336 Although
controlled by federal maritime law, the court stated that it was consistent
with Florida law to look unfavorably upon exculpatory clauses seeking to
absolve a party from its own negligence and to find such clauses ineffective
absent clear and unequivocal language.337 The court found the language in
this release to be sufficient in its specific reference to a number of risks, in-
cluding "ship's wakes," which caused the injury in this case and the refer-
ence to release all "principals, directors, officers, agents, [and] employees...
from any and all liability ... for any and all injury or damage. ''338
The Third District Court of Appeal decided a case dealing with a claim
of interference with testamentary capacity in In re Hatten.339 The case, an
appeal of a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dealt with an alle-
gation that the decedent had disinherited three relatives, including her
brother, Louis. 34 The plaintiffs filed an adversary action against Louis, al-
leging that he had taken away the will of the deceased and destroyed it.34'
The evidence supporting the existence of the will consisted of statements
from the three plaintiffs, who were beneficiaries of the alleged will.342 The
defendant argued that the evidence should be barred by the hearsay rule and
the Dead Man's Statute.343 After quickly disposing of the hearsay objection
by noting the specific exemption for statements relating to wills, the court
332. Id. at 893.
333. 866 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
334. Id. at 109.
335. Id. at 110.
336. Id. at 109.
337. Id. at 111.
338. Hopkins, 866 So. 2d at 112.
339. 880 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1273.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 1274.
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next addressed the Dead Man's Statute issue.3" Because the Dead Man's
Statute applies to a person interested in an action in a representative capacity,
the court held that it did not apply to this action, in which the defendant was
being sued for damages in his personal capacity for his tortious act.
345
In Haskins v. City of Fort Lauderdale,34 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal decided an appeal of an invasion of privacy and negligent investiga-
tion claim. 347 The plaintiff, Robin Haskins, alleged that while working as a
civilian employee for the City of Fort Lauderdale Police Department, her
office was illegally searched for illegal diet pills. 348 In the criminal case in
which she was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent
to sell and/or deliver, the evidence obtained in the search was suppressed and
the state nolle prossed the charge.349 Her labor union filed a grievance in
relation to her job termination, which resulted in a finding that there was not
just cause for her dismissal.35° The appellate court upheld the trial court's
summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations. 35 ' The appellate
court rejected the arguments that the statute was either tolled until the crimi-
nal court ruled that the search was illegal or until the arbitration proceedings
on the labor grievance were completed.352
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered an appeal of malicious
prosecution and false arrest claims in Daniel v. Village of Royal Palm
Beach.353 In this case, Felicia Daniel filed a malicious prosecution claim for
her arrest for aggravated assault.354 According to witnesses, Daniel was driv-
ing carelessly and harassing an unmarked police car.355 The court held that
"the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Daniel for reckless driv-
ing. 356 She was later tried and acquitted of this charge.357 Despite the fact
that she was arrested for aggravated assault and disputed many facts alleged
by the witnesses, the court held that a summary judgment was appropriate
because "[t]he validity of an arrest does not turn on the [charge] announced
344. Hatten, 880 So. 2d at 1274-75.
345. Id. at 1276.
346. 898 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
347. Id. at 1122.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Haskins, 898 So. 2d at 1124.
352. Id. at 1123.
353. 889 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
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by the officer at the time" of an arrest and the factual disputes are not mate-
rial to the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest.358
The Fourth District also decided a claim concerning a loss of consor-
tium set forth by a child who was a fetus at the time of injury in Larusso v.
Garner.3 5 9 The mother was three months pregnant with the child, Braden,
when she was in an automobile accident that resulted in her sustaining severe
brain injuries.3" Despite being in a coma, she carried Braden to term.361 The
court evaluated the claim under the Florida Statutes establishing a child's
right to loss of parental consortium-section 768.0415.362 It was argued that
the defendants did not fit within the statutory term "unmarried dependent" so
as to qualify for the damages.363 However, the court held that "[b]ecause
Florida follows the 'born alive' doctrine," which permits minors who are
"born alive" to seek compensation for injuries occurring to them or their
parents, it would deem the statute to provide coverage. 6 It did, however,
find that the lower court erred in awarding filial consortium damages beyond
Braden's reaching the age of majority, although it agreed that Braden's dam-
ages could so extend.365
In Broz v. Rodriguez,366 the Fourth District Court of Appeal considered
the application of a release.367 The plaintiff, Grace Broz, appealed a final
judgment in favor of a number of defendant doctors. 368 Broz fell at the Rock-
ing Horse Ranch and first sued the ranch in a lawsuit that was settled.369 She
then filed suit against the defendants in this action for surgery on her injuries,
which she claimed was negligently performed.370 In the general release
signed with the ranch, she did not reserve a claim against the defendants in
this action.37' In interpreting section 768.041, Florida Statutes, the court
held that she must have so reserved to hold subsequent tortfeasors liable.372
358. Daniel, 889 So. 2d at 991.
359. 888 So. 2d 712, 716 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
360. Id. at715.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 720; see FLA. STAT. § 768.0415 (2004).
363. Larusso, 888 So. 2d at 719.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 721.
366. 891 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
367. Id. at 1206.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Broz, 891 So. 2d at 1206.
372. See id. at 1207-08.
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The res ipsa loquitur doctrine was applied by the Fourth District Court
of Appeal in Nodurft v. Servico Centre Ass'n.373 The plaintiff, Colleen
Nodurft, alleged that she was injured in the ladies' restroom of an Omni Ho-
tel when "a wall-mounted trash receptacle fell from the wall and struck her
foot. '374  Two witnesses testified that receptacles in the restrooms were
loose.375 The plaintiff requested a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur, which
was denied. 376 The court noted that Florida courts had expanded the doctrine
beyond its origins, including the notion that the defendant had exclusive con-
trol of the instrumentality causing injury.377 The court then held that al-
though the receptacle "was in a public place and accessible to ... the public,
the Omni had 'sufficient exclusivity' [of its control] to rule out the chance
that [it] fell from the wall as a result of the actions of some other agency." 378
Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.379
The Fifth District Court of Appeal decided a malicious prosecution ap-
peal in Doss v. Bank of America, N.A. 380 Bank of America sued Doss for
payment on bogus checks, endorsed by a forger.3 8 Doss opened a savings
account at the bank, but did not have a checking account with it.382 The
forger, who forged Doss' name on the checks, presented identification indi-
cating that she was Doss.383 The bank's fraud investigator concluded that
Doss had nothing to do with the check-cashing scheme and recommended
that no collection action be taken against Doss.384 The bank could not ex-
plain why the lawsuit had been filed.385 Doss agreed to a joint stipulation for
dismissal of the bank's collection action.386 In Doss' malicious prosecution
action, the bank asserted that Doss had not received "a 'bona fide' termina-
tion of the collection suit" because of the joint stipulation of dismissal.387
Although the court noted that cases that terminate due to settlements or
joint stipulations do not normally qualify as bona fide terminations for mali-
373. 884 So. 2d 395, 396 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
374. Id.
375. See id.
376. Id. at 397.
377. See id. at 398.
378. Nodurft, 884 So. 2d at 398.
379. Id.
380. 857 So. 2d 991, 992 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
381. Id. at 994.
382. Id. at 993.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 993-94.
385. Doss, 857 So. 2d at 994.
386. Id.
387. Id.
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cious prosecution actions, such is not always the case.388 It noted that courts
must look at "the total circumstances." '389 Although the bank agreed to resti-
tution of $37.14, which it had set-off when it first discovered the forged
checks, the court held that such was actually an admission by the bank that it
recognized Doss' innocence.390 Further, it deemed her waiver of interest to
be de minimus because the interest on the $37.14 would have been miniscule
and her waiver of attorney's fees in the action was not significant since there
was no basis to claim them.39' It held that her failure to seek attorney's fees
pursuant to section 57.105 in the collection suit was also not fatal.392
The Fifth District Court of Appeal decided a defamation case in
Fariello v. Gavin.393 Fariello appealed the dismissal of his complaint on the
basis of the litigation privilege.394 Fariello claimed that Craig Gavin, presi-
dent of the Crystal Hills Mini Farms Unit I and 2 Association, Inc., made
slanderous comments about Fariello that "Fariello had committed the crime
of perjury in connection with certain of his professional qualifications. 395
The trial court granted motions for summary judgment on the basis that it felt
it permissible for Gavin to question the credibility of "Fariello publicly be-
cause the two men were adversaries in the prior lawsuit. ' 396 Because immu-
nity is an affirmative defense, the court held that it would normally be inap-
propriate to dismiss the complaint unless it demonstrated on its face that the
defense applied.3 97 The court held that it was not so apparent in this case.398
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied
Florida's crashworthiness doctrine in Bearint v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc. 3
9 9
The plaintiff's parents appealed a verdict that Cosco, manufacturer of an
automobile safety seat in which their son, Kagan, was seated at the time of
an accident was not liable for the injuries that he sustained.4°° Saturn auto-
mobile company, which was also sued, settled prior to trial.4"'
388. Id. at 995.
389. Id.
390. Doss, 857 So. 2d at 995.
391. Id. at 995-96.
392. Id. at 996.
393. 873 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 1245.
398. Fariello, 873 So. 2d at 1245.
399. 389 F.3d 1339, 1348 (11 th Cir. 2004).
400. Id. at 1343.
401. Id. at 1344.
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In considering the applicable Supreme Court of Florida case, D'Amario
v. Ford Motor Co.,4°2 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the
applicability of the crashworthiness doctrine, which precludes consideration
of the fault of initial tortfeasor who cause a crash when a device in the car
causes enhanced injuries.43 In this case, in which the design of Saturn's
front seat was considered a cause of the injury, the court ruled that a proper
application of the doctrine would permit the jury to consider Saturn's contri-
bution to the injury of the infant.n n
402. 806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2001).
403. See Bearint, 389 F.3d at 1345-47.
404. See id. at 1348.
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